The vote of May 11th and the awakening of the Economic Voter – The challenge of promises on Pensions and Wages

In May 11, 2025 elections marked a paradigmatic shift in the electoral behavior of Albanian citizens. For the first time, as highlighted by the Altax analysis, economic voters dominated the political scene, placing material interests and personal well-being at the center of their choice. This represents a shift from ideological or clientelist voting towards a rational and demanding economic vote[1].

This reflects the fact that citizens are no longer passive in the face of general political discourse but demand concrete origins of promises, clear budgetary planning, and fiscal transparency. In this sense, the economic vote is not a vote for personal benefits but an instrument for systemic change that forces politics to serve and not rule.

The May 11, 2025 elections reinforced this reality in an unprecedented manner. According to media assessments, for the first time in 35 years of transition, a majority of economic voters was recorded – around 1.7 million citizens, both within and outside the country. This voting mass did not merely seek political rotation but a direct connection between their vote and the offer for economic well-being.

The electoral focus of the main parties (SP, DP) and new parties confirms this trend, with an absolute priority placed on:

• Increasing pensions (up to doubling),
• Increasing the average salary, especially in the public sector,
• Periodic social bonuses,
• Reforms for fairer budget distribution.

Why did this voting shift occur?

The shift towards economic voting in the May 11 elections did not happen randomly. It was the result of a long accumulation of structural factors that have deeply influenced citizens’ daily lives and the way they perceive the role of the state and politics. These factors are not isolated but interconnected and signal a prolonged crisis of well-being, public trust, and the functioning of social policies.

Firstly, the rising cost of living has been a key factor motivating citizens to vote based on their economic interests. Food inflation, high energy and housing prices, and the lack of protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups have made many citizens feel financially unprotected. This insecurity has reinforced the demand for a political offer that guarantees not only income growth but also long-term economic stability.

At the same time, economic inequalities have significantly deepened. While a small part of society has benefited from new economic opportunities, the vast majority – especially the middle and lower classes – has experienced stagnation or even deterioration of living conditions. This has created a strong sense of injustice and demand for a fairer redistribution of public income.

Another driver of this shift has been the poor quality of public services. Many citizens feel that, despite increasing taxes and contributions, the level of education, healthcare, and public administration does not meet expectations. This creates a disbalance between civic obligations and the benefits the state provides, increasing the demand for deep reforms in public services.

Finally, the increasing role of the Diaspora has played a significant part. The more active involvement of emigrants in the elections has brought a more critical and demanding perspective on governance. The Diaspora, known for its experience with Western standards, has pushed forward the demand for efficiency, transparency, and reforms that lead to sustainable well-being.

Overall, these factors have created an environment where the Albanian citizen no longer merely seeks a political representative but a good manager of public finances, a guarantor of equity, and a real provider of well-being. The economic vote is, in this sense, a vote for accountability and results.

The promises for pensions and wages by the main parties were ambitious, but with technical gaps and limited fiscal realism.
They were nonetheless compelled in the process of formulating these promises also by the entrance of new parties (Together, Opportunity, Albania Moves Forward, Initiative, etc.)

To win the heart and vote of an increasingly economically aware electorate, political parties in the May 11 elections faced a new challenge:

• to speak the language of the citizen’s pocket. This year’s voter was no longer simply motivated by political loyalty or party identity; they demanded clear accountability, concrete solutions, and credible plans for their economic well-being.

In response to this new demand, parties were forced to formulate clear economic programs, where promises for wage and pension increases were no longer kept at the level of slogans, but presented with timelines, objectives, and approximate costs.

A new political narrative was built, highlighting social justice, income redistribution, and the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as the elderly, youth, and emigrants.

The Socialist Party, as the winner of these elections, understood this shift better than the others. It capitalized on the orientation toward the economic vote by presenting the ambitious program “SP 2030.”

This program, more than a work plan, was presented as a social contract with the citizen, where key points included:

• Doubling the average pensions by 2030, as a guarantee for more dignity for the elderly;
• Increasing the average salary in the public sector to 1200 euros, to strengthen the middle class and curb professional emigration;
• Greater appreciation for the contribution of the Diaspora, treating it not just as a source of remittances but as an active part of economic development;
• An approach toward the youth leaving the country, by creating conditions that can turn emigration into a choice, not a necessity.

This new political approach, closer to real economic needs, marks an important turning point in how political trust is built in Albania. The economic voter is here to stay, and programs without a real basis can no longer convince.

To deeply analyze two of the most important promises of the “SP 2030” Program, the doubling of average pensions and the increase of the average salary in the public sector to 1200 euros, we will follow a reflective structure that combines technical feasibility, budgetary effects, and social impact.

From the analysis split into two directions, the following is evidenced:

a. Doubling average pensions by 2030
This promise, expected to become a key point of the 2025–2029 governing program, is directly linked to the demands of the economic voter, especially pensioners and families dependent on them. In a context where inflation has eroded purchasing power and where temporary bonuses have been more palliative than structural solutions, a real increase in pensions is a necessity.

This promise strongly resonates with vulnerable social categories, especially pensioners facing an increasingly expensive economic reality. But on a technical level, its feasibility remains moderate, as it requires systemic intervention in the social insurance scheme and a clear calendar for increases.

The main reason for the assessment of this promise’s feasibility in its current presentation is linked to implementation uncertainties. Although the goal is clear, the implementation mechanism is missing, as there is still no addressal of questions such as:

• Will it be a sustainable monthly increase built within the social insurance scheme?
• Or will periodic bonuses be used again, which are temporary and not sustainable in terms of the basic pension?
• Will the increase be split as 20% per year (which is very high for the current context), or will there be varying paces based on budget capacity?

The fiscal cost and sustainability of the scheme is, in fact, the core of implementing this promise to turn it into a government program point.

Such an increase translates to an additional 340 million euros per year for the budget. This raises essential questions:

• How will this increase be financed? Will it come from increased tax revenues, fiscal administration reform, or cuts to secondary expenditures?
• Is there a new projection of the social insurance scheme to foresee the additions without destabilizing the balance between contributions and benefits?
• If financing is done through direct budget transfers, does the government have a strategy to protect the system from chronic budget dependency?

Without a clear schematic and financial model, the risk is that this promise becomes a repeated electoral instrument, without long-term impact on pensioners’ dignity.

The budgetary cost is extremely high, over 340 million euros annually, implying the need for a sustainable fiscal model, not just a solution based on periodic bonuses or ad-hoc maneuvers.

The political risk is also high, as any delay, non-implementation, or distortion of the promise could undermine the trust of a broad segment of the electorate. For this reason, this promise cannot be realized without deep structural reform, which must affect revenue, fiscal administration, and the sustainability of the pension scheme.

b. Increasing the average salary in the public sector to €1200

Compared to pensions, increasing the average public sector salary to €1200 is technically more feasible, particularly if implemented in a gradual and targeted manner. This promise carries a moderate fiscal cost and is more manageable, as it affects a smaller number of beneficiaries and can be linked to civil service reform.

This increase represents a €200 (or 20%) rise over a 4–5 year period. In nominal terms, this is achievable.

The political risk is moderate—expectations are high, but the implementation path can be managed through clear timelines and transparent allocations.

However, the main challenge lies in how it will be implemented:

• Will it be a linear increase (e.g., €40 per year)?
• Or will there be one or two larger adjustments, based on the overall wage budget growth?

The main risks involve internal balance and competition with the private sector.
If the increase is uneven across sectors, it may create structural imbalances within the administration.
If public sector wages become significantly more competitive than those in the private sector (especially for technical and professional roles), this could harm the free labor market’s competitiveness and distort career motivations.

Once again, the desired outcome cannot be achieved without structural reform—ensuring that salary increases do not create new inequalities, do not harm the private labor market, and instead support productivity growth in the public administration.

This promise—likely to be part of the governing program—requires a proper multi-year budgeting framework tied to the performance of public revenues.
It also necessitates a labor market impact assessment to avoid draining human resources from the private sector.

The broader economic voter demands go beyond salary increases

The economic voter in the May 11 election emerged as a new but very conscious actor. This voter is not motivated solely by numerical increases in pensions or wages but by a deeper expectation of a new governance model—one that places social justice and economic efficiency at the core of public policy.

Here are the four fundamental pillars of this new orientation:

1. Fairer Distribution of public revenues

The economic voter demands a fairer distribution of public revenues—one that does not favor government-linked groups or politically localized interests.
They are not sympathetic to luxury projects, low-return investments, or non-transparent tenders.
Instead, they want funds directed toward citizens’ real needs: quality education, efficient public transport, better healthcare access, and modern technology.

2. A Progressive and Fair Tax System

This voter rejects a tax system that treats everyone the same. Tax equity is not the same as tax uniformity.
They demand fiscal progressivity—those who earn more should contribute more, and the tax burden should not unfairly fall on lower and middle-income groups.
They also call for tax administration reform, to combat evasion and level the playing field between tax-compliant and non-compliant businesses.

3. A New State-Citizen Contract

For this voter, the relationship with the state is no longer a passive one of receiving benefits, but a bilateral contract.
If citizens contribute through taxes, they expect quality public services in return:

• schools that educate citizens, not just grant diplomas;
• hospitals that treat patients, not redirect them to private care;
• an administration that solves problems, not creates obstacles.

From this perspective, salary and pension increases are just a fragment of a greater demand for a functional and accountable state.

4. Engaging the Albanian Diaspora as a development actor

The Albanian diaspora, as an economic voter, must be seen not only as an electoral force but as a developmental actor.
They seek more than just voting access—they demand institutional engagement, investment mechanisms, and smoother paths for knowledge and capital return.

Policies toward the diaspora should go beyond patriotic messaging and be materialized through real instruments for inclusion in the country’s long-term economic development.

At its core, the economic voter seeks a New Public Contract

Citizens’ well-being must no longer rely solely on promises but on governance that is fair, transparent, and visionary.
This requires governments not only to make immediate interventions (like salary increases or pension bonuses), but also to undertake bold reforms that change how Albania is governed, taxed, and invested in.

Contextual implication for 2025 Elections

The 2025 election vote is a clear message that demands a political response—one which is still unformed.

Thus, the May 11 election was not merely a political contest but a referendum on economic equity and social well-being.
The promises made aligned with these citizen demands. However, in the absence of detailed implementation plans from opposition parties, these promises risked turning into disappointment—even though the Socialist Party also failed to present detailed plans, relying instead on pre-approved governance programs.

To rise to the political moment marked by the May 11 vote, the governing majority no longer has the luxury of offering generic programs.
The economic voter demands clarity, consistency, and accountability.
This means:

• (a) offering a detailed financial plan for promise implementation,
• (b) building credible monitoring mechanisms,
• (c) and reformulating the logic of budgeting—not as a mere accounting tool, but as a tool for development and social redistribution.

Final message

The vote of May 11 was not just a vote for politics—but for politics with justice.
It calls for a new relationship between state and citizen—where economic development is inclusive, fair, and measurable.Now is the time for governance to shift: from words to implementation, from electoral tactics to long-term social strategy.

[1] The Concept of the Economic Vote

The economic vote refers to the choice of political representatives by citizens based on their material, social, and financial interests. It reflects a rational behavior by voters, responding to their expectations for:

• Increased income (wages and pensions),
• Lower cost of living,
• Higher-quality and fairer public services,
• Greater equity in the distribution of public revenues.

In this sense, citizens are no longer primarily influenced by political rhetoric or party identity, but by what tangibly affects their everyday lives.