Natural disasters and corruption also monitored by civil society

Corruption in cases of natural disasters[1] is a worrying problem that is being felt in the direction of burdening the state budget by a large burden and influencing in other directions, but with the partially transparent way and forms of procurement of funds it seems that it is having the effect of undermining government legitimacy and exacerbating social and economic costs.

Corruption exists in different forms and degrees in every country. Its devastating impacts on poverty growth, economic growth, and political and social stability have been increasingly recognized over the past two decades by scholars and civil society around the world.

According to many analyzes carried out on the effects of corruption in the case of the earthquake in 2019 and then the global pandemic in the moments after they happened, we have noticed that the consequences of its spread are similar to those of Albania even in some countries that approximate the quality of democracy and public institutions and the fight against corruption. The extent of the effect of corruption in all cases after natural disasters has had a negative impact on economic development, inequality, poverty, abuse of power, governance integrity and the state budget.

The reasons presented by each of the researchers after carefully watching the manifestations of corruption were based on the governance model related to the supervisory role, the lack of ability to control oneself, weak institutional capacities, little transparency and dysfunctional accountability, insufficient budget , ineffective coordination of aid from the international community, limited and problematic planning of programs, as well as exceeding political powers in economic, infrastructural and social recovery programs.

In an initial addressing of the problems that we have already mentioned in previous analyses[2], where the same symptoms as mentioned above were found, we first discussed about the non-transparent procedures and the accountability mechanism used not according to legal formats and the ethics of communication with the public by not allowing all interested parties to evaluate the intentions and actions undertaken in the aid and reconstruction processes. In the entire decision-making process for the distribution of reconstruction funds, consultations and public debate have been ignored, thus damaging the sense of belonging and reducing mutual trust.

The impact of the government’s decisions[3] on coping with natural disasters has left unexplained questions about the form and manner, time and deviations of decision-making, where it seems that a part of them, using the emergency artefacts from natural disasters, is oriented by political preferences, which determine budget orientations for infrastructure, the effectiveness of emergency responses and health care services, where governance is alienated as a business practice and compliance with building standards is tolerated.

Our analyzes show that the failure to address all the reasons for defusing governance problems has had its impact on the unchanged status quo of the critical relationship between economic development and institutional capacity, with little effect on strengthening good governance and combating effective of corruption.

In these analyses, we did not count SPAK’s accusations against high-level leaders and their subordinates, as they are mostly not influenced by the government’s denunciations.

Corruption as a complex phenomenon that affects all sectors is no longer limited to economic and institutional aspects.

It is enough to go back in time in the case of the causes of the consequences from the earthquake, but also later in the cases of problems with the medical infrastructure in the pandemic period, to understand some consequences with human life, economic and social damage, which necessarily includes the harmful impact of corruption.

In our opinion, corruption directly affected the low quality of buildings and social infrastructure, the weakness of the health management system. The risk of increasing the worsening of the effects is clearly seen, in case additional funds would not have been invested from the budget instead of being taken directly from widespread corruption.

Therefore, we emphasize the importance of promoting effective anti-measures against the causes of corruption to strengthen not only the institutions, but also to create a favorable environment for more transparency of governance and the proper use of public resources, as also emphasized from an IMF study[4].

It is precisely the deficiencies in the fulfillment of all the objectives of the responsible institutions that, with favoritism, deviations, non-fulfillment of programs in the specified time, as well as ineffective actions, have potentially influenced the stimulation of opportunities for corruption and ineffective management in aid and reconstruction operations [5] and the pandemic situation [6], as follows:

• Influence on the allocation of massive budget funds, creating premises and opportunities for mismanagement, diversion and corruption. Large financial resources, as well as foreign aid mainly in kind, in the conditions of a weak culture of cooperation between institutions have in some cases been a dangerous lure for those who have access to them[7].
• Urgent requests for rapid assistance although not solely affected by disasters may have prompted an inappropriate assessment of needs[8]. In various cases, actions have been introduced that have resulted in poor targeting, over-supply or lack of aid, as well as inappropriate launch of projects creating opportunities for exploitation by corrupt parties.
• Similarly, the pressure to deliver aid quickly to areas damaged by the late 2019 earthquake and the political decision to ensure rapid reconstruction leaves room for circumventing standard procedures, in particular procurement rules as the real moment for transparency in allocation of contracts. Although the need for expedited procedures is understandable, the potential for abuse appears to have increased in those cases where there have been allegations of deviation from the standard on procurement procedures.

In analytical reaction, we should read findings as above from the Anticorruption Department. However, we found that the anti-corruption institution and its branches in the government have not presented analyzes or reports to clarify the types of corruption [9]. The anti-corruption report should show what has happened with the internal funds and foreign aid, as well as the procedures for the reconstruction operations, where it should be clear about the cases investigated and the preventive and striking measures. In fact, this has only been done by the media, starting with numerous illustrations and denunciations that ranged from fraud, embezzlement, misuse of assets to the diversion of aid resources and outright bribery.

But when the institution of accountability, transparency and anti-corruption has a reporting outside its scope of action with weak findings and reactive actions before a potential situation for corrupt acts, it is unlikely to be stronger and more reliable in a situation of future.

Indeed, the central position of the state in much of the reception, coordination and delivery of aid has worried public opinion about the great potential for misuse.

Procurement fraud is a common evil even under perfectly normal conditions, but in disaster situations it turns out that the procurement process and the awarding of large contracts are particularly prone to corruption. Procurement standards bypassing parliament in approving funds, as well as not considering the public at all, definitely have a strong suspicion for anyone, that such actions have softened the criteria to ensure rapid reconstruction, but this is likely to have been exploited by the organization or corrupt companies.

Given that large sums were involved, both for reconstruction contracts, as well as for health infrastructure and various goods and equipment, the spaces to carry out corrupt acts did not present us at least the reactions of internal audits and financial and fiscal bodies. No government report guarantees whether the contractors have built an infrastructure with standards, with quality materials, within budgeted costs, with security for future cases, etc.

A still unexplained suspicion is the political benefit from natural disaster situations directly related to the frequent decisions to divert funds and priorities of reconstruction according to areas a few months before the local elections. All this approach, in a situation of hybrid democracy and in the absence of transparency and accountability, adds to the suspicions of exceeding the principles of good governance, since it has not created guarantees that through the decisions and the effect of government propaganda, credits for influences have not been secured electoral in areas where the ruling party has not had popularity and support.

Under these conditions, when these criteria are met, then the electoral race has a big bonus for the government, with a strong impact on the breakdown of political competition. Of course, it also has an impact on the corruption of the will of the local electorate. Elites and powerful individuals in communities are the potential enforcers to manipulate opinion and increase profits by taking credit that belongs to taxpayers.

But what can be changed in this undesirable environment by the majority of citizens in future cases, but also for everyday life?

Addressing cases and discussing the effects of corruption as a direct influencer on high disaster risk specifically can provide a model for improving public trust in other state institutions serving as a balancing act of power.

1. As discussed above, the process of natural disaster recovery has multiple actors involved. It is therefore essential that the government in forced cooperation with experts, civil society organizations, donors work together, as the common fight against corruption has at its core mutual trust by strengthening accountability in the use of resources among all interested parties.

Monitoring, evaluation and reporting should be critical tools for accountability and minimizing the risk of corruption. However, they are only more effective if carried out independently by activist organizations and individuals responsible for program implementation.

Although internal control in institutions is necessary and sufficient, it seems that deficiencies from patronage and institutional dependence have affected them by losing confidence as independent monitoring capacities.

The involvement of all stakeholders in the aid process can only be guaranteed if sufficient transparency and accountability systems are in place and functioning.

In order to demand full accountability, the government itself must seek new mechanisms for tracking and monitoring outside the institutions it has approved and which are functioning poorly and even influenced by the corrupt.

In this sense, civil society organizations and beneficiary communities should benefit from resources from the state budget to enable the monitoring of aid flows and the intermediate and final assessment of the fulfillment of the objectives of aid and reconstruction projects.

Effective evaluation and reporting mechanisms will enable the activation of the Ministry against corruption as well as the media and the general public to communicate perceived cases of abuse and corruption throughout the process of aid or project development.

2. The lack of consultation with citizens, especially with civil society, results in little monitoring of the projects and the benefits from aid. This behavior further worsens the situation of the people and the economy most affected. Therefore, the whole process should have a dedicated focus on people as a product of inclusive participation. All interested parties should be involved in decision-making processes, from the initial assessment of needs to the design of projects, procurement, implementation, evaluation and reporting, having a special place in all these procedures where their comments can be.

Better relations with local civil society organizations and affected communities can help reduce errors in targeting and fair distribution of resources to prevent influence from the corrupt, but to ensure that aid is also accurate and efficient.

3. Strong accountability mechanisms are another critical factor in curbing corruption. According to Wiehen (2005), full accountability refers to “…the ability of governments and aid providers to account fully for their institutions, to any external control body and to the end beneficiaries of aid, for the appropriate use of resources, the quality of the final product and its effective delivery”. 

[1] Different categories of natural disasters include (a) geophysical (earthquakes, massive earth movement and volcanic activity), (b) meteorological (extreme temperatures, storms and floods), (c) hydrological (floods, landslides and the action of water erosion), (d) climatological (drought, explosions, fire) and (e) biological (epidemic, insect and animal infestation).

[2] https://altax.al/ekonomia-duhet-te-kishte-te-njejtin-fokus-si-programi-i-rindertimit/

[3] https://planifikimi.gov.al/index.php?id=94

[4] https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2023/English/wpiea2023220-print-pdf.ashx

[5] https://panel.klsh.org.al/storage/phpQ4rBYo.pdf

[6] https://panel.klsh.org.al/storage/phpeuTNYc.pdf

[7] https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/7393294.html

[8] https://www.co-plan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Përgjigja_Nivel_Lokal_COVID19_062020.pdf

[9] https://sipermarrja.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Raport-Vjetor-Kombëtar-për-Antikorrupsionin.pdf