Albania and the new trade Corridors: Infrastructure, regional connectivity and the cost of delay

Recent developments in China–Central and Eastern Europe logistical cooperation, clearly reflected in the China–CEE Logistics Cooperation Conference held in Beijing in September 2026, make it even more important to understand where Albania will position itself on the new map of European corridors. The conference was not limited to traditional transport. Discussions focused on cross-border corridors, road transport, railways, multimodal transport, the digitalization of logistics chains, regional hubs, and the link between transport corridors and trade. Significantly, within this framework, projects were signed linking transport, logistics centers, ports, and multimodal transport.

This development coincides with a broader change in the way Eurasian corridors are being developed. Today, it is not enough to have a port, a highway, or a railway line. Economic value is created when these infrastructures operate as a single system and when cargo can move from ship to rail, from rail to road, and then toward the market, with as few stops, administrative costs, and waiting times as possible.

Here we need to stop and analyze the Albanian case.

Our country has an important geographical advantage, because Durrës or Porto Romano can create a direct outlet for Western Balkan corridors toward the Adriatic. But geographical advantage cannot automatically be taken for granted as an economic advantage. It becomes one only when it is transformed into functional logistics capacity.

During the time that has passed and where we stand today, projects have not been lacking, but the time required to turn them into a functional system has been wasted.

The position of Durrës is more important than the mere size of the Albanian economy would suggest. According to INSTAT, in the first quarter of 2026, the Port of Durrës handled 95.2% of the volume of goods transported through Albanian ports, or around 2.17 million tons. The volume was 39.8% higher than in the same quarter of 2025.

This indicator presents us with two things at the same time. First, Durrës is already the dominant maritime hub of the Albanian economy, and second, the increase in volume shows that demand for logistics capacity already exists before the new infrastructure is built.

Therefore, the discussion about Porto Romano does not make sense if presented simply as a matter of port dimensions. That is the simplest part. The debate becomes meaningful when it is clarified whether we are capable of using the new port as a regional trade hub and not merely as a more modern and larger port for the Albanian market.

If Porto Romano is functionally connected to the railway, Corridor VIII, the road network, and storage centers, then its value will not be measured only by the tons of goods it handles, but above all by the number of trade corridors that can pass through it.

This is an essential visionary approach.

If we have only a national port, then it will primarily serve the national economy. But if we have a regional port, then we have entered the right path to generate revenues not only from ourselves, but also from the economies of other countries. In our case, this means that part of the flow of goods toward Kosovo, North Macedonia, and further toward Central Europe could be directed toward the Adriatic through Albania.

In this scenario, the benefit would not be limited to the port. It would extend to transport, warehousing, insurance, customs, financial services, maintenance, distribution, goods processing, and the creation of industrial zones along the corridor.

Therefore, the port would become the starting point of a logistics economy.

Why is the railway the element that determines whether this potential is realized or not?

In the corridor debate, the discussion becomes decisive when railway integration is included.

The Albanian government itself has argued that Porto Romano should be connected to the railway system and that rail transport is more efficient for distributing goods arriving by sea. The budget documents and official communications envisage connecting Porto Romano with Sukth and then with the Durrës–Tirana network, while Durrës–Rrogozhinë has been conceived as part of Corridor VIII.

This is economically reasonable, because a large port without a fast railway connection to its hinterland creates a problem by increasing the capacity for goods to enter, while failing to maintain the same level of investment in the capacity to distribute them.

If cargo entering Porto Romano has to leave mainly by trucks, then part of the port’s advantage is lost in the land segment. Costs, time, traffic, and emissions increase. If, on the other hand, cargo moves directly onto the railway and is then distributed through the regional network, Albania can transform itself from a destination for goods into a transit and distribution country.

This is why the Durrës–Rrogozhinë railway should not be viewed as an isolated transport project. It is part of the infrastructure of the future port.

The current project for the rehabilitation of the Durrës–Rrogozhinë line covers around 34 kilometers, the reconstruction of bridges and tunnels, five stations, ETCS Level 1 and GSM-R signaling systems, as well as climate adaptation measures. The initial procurement deadline has been postponed several times during 2026, while the procurement documents set the expected duration of the works at 48 months.

The government’s response is one of the points where the notion of “delay” takes on economic meaning.

A delay is not simply a date postponed on the calendar. In a corridor-based economy, a delay in one segment can prevent the entire corridor from functioning.

The government is not deciding whether to build the infrastructure today or three years from now in a vacuum. But the time Albania is not building is the same time during which neighboring countries are building.

North Macedonia has advanced on the eastern part of Corridor VIII. The Kumanovo–Beljakovce section, approximately 30.8 kilometers long, was completed in December 2024 and is operational. Meanwhile, in July 2026, Bulgaria and North Macedonia established a joint committee for the cross-border railway tunnel toward Bulgaria and approved a preliminary timetable for its preparation and construction.

This means that Corridor VIII is gradually taking the form of a real network rather than remaining merely a strategic idea.

If the eastern part of the corridor advances faster than the Albanian section, we risk an abnormal situation in which the corridor exists on the European map, but the Albanian section is not capable of fully absorbing the flows it generates.

This is therefore much more serious than an infrastructure delay, because there is a significant risk of losing position.

The China–CEE Conference in Beijing in September 2026 makes this issue even more pressing. The strategy emerging from China–CEE cooperation is not simply about increasing bilateral trade. It is about creating faster and more diversified corridors for goods between Asia and Europe. The Beijing discussions specifically emphasized the combination of railways, roads, ports, logistics centers, and multimodal transport.

At the same time, Uzbekistan and the Central Asian countries are actively investing in the Trans-Caspian Corridor, focusing on railways, roads, logistics networks, the digitalization of trade documents, and private-sector participation. The EU has included this within the Global Gateway framework and is treating it as a strategic connection between Central Asia and Europe.

These movements and changes in the transport map are also creating a shift in the logic of competition.

Goods are not necessarily looking only for the geographically shortest route, but also for the most reliable, predictable, and cost-effective route overall.

For Albania, this remains an opportunity, but also a warning about the time that has been wasted.

If Asian networks become more strongly connected with the ports and corridors of Central Europe through Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and beyond, Durrës must offer a more reliable alternative in order to influence the movement of goods. Otherwise, there is no economic reason for flows to change their route simply because Albania has a favorable geographical position.

Porto Romano is now facing one of the most concrete delays, not simply because it is “moving slowly,” but because construction has not even started. In March 2026, the tender procedure for the construction of the new commercial port, with a value of around €393 million, was cancelled after the only consortium remaining in the competition failed to submit its financial offer within the deadline. This fact has much greater significance than an ordinary procedural problem.

A port project of these strategic dimensions lost momentum at the procurement stage, delaying not only the construction of the port itself, but also a series of investments dependent on it. The Porto Romano–Sukth railway, logistics zones, warehouses, multimodal terminals, and private investments waiting for a clear signal regarding the port’s future capacity cannot be planned with the same degree of certainty.

In its monitoring of the 2025–2029 Government Program, PoliFakt identifies infrastructure as the most problematic component of Pillar II, with a score of 64 points. The report highlights high capital costs, time-related difficulties, and the fiscal risk associated with PPPs. In the same monitoring, Porto Romano is described as having low progress, delays in tendering, and a feasibility index of only 50%.

This is highly significant because this is not a general political criticism. PoliFakt’s methodology itself separates feasibility from political declarations and evaluates it across fiscal, institutional, temporal, and coherence dimensions.

Therefore, the problem is not related to the vision and programs on paper, but to the implementation capacity that is falling behind the vision.

The railway shows the same gap, with a similar picture.

In PoliFakt’s report for the period September 2025–February 2026, the operationalization of the Tirana–Durrës–Rinas line is assessed as having low progress and a feasibility index of 50%, while the construction of the Tirana Center–PTT and Sukth–Porto Romano lines is assessed as having minimal progress and a feasibility score of 40%. Regional connectivity through Vorë–Hani i Hotit, Durrës–Rrogozhinë, and Rrogozhinë–Pogradec receives 60%, with progress considered modest.

The Tirana–Durrës railway and the connection to Rinas are now targeted for operation by the end of 2027, while the institutions have stated the objective of completing Durrës–Rrogozhinë and Vorë–Hani i Hotit by 2030.

This shows a willingness for real progress. But this is precisely where the difference lies between being “in progress” and achieving strategic positioning.

Previous infrastructure projects have held this status and have nevertheless been far too slow for the country’s economic needs.

In international corridors, time is part of competitiveness.

If a logistics company has to wait several years for a railway connection to become operational, it will meanwhile establish contracts, terminals, and commercial relationships along another corridor. Once the alternative corridor becomes operational, changing the route does not happen automatically.

What does the government program say and what does PoliFakt show?

The 2025–2029 Government Program has essentially selected the right priorities in this regard. Corridor VIII, railways, Porto Romano, connections with ports, and European networks have been placed at the center of the infrastructure vision.

Moreover, government documents treat Corridor VIII not merely as a highway, but as a multimodal corridor where roads, railways, energy, and digital infrastructure should be developed together.

European financing is also a major advantage. The Durrës–Rrogozhinë project has a grant of around €60.5 million and an indicative value of around €122.9 million under the WBIF framework, while the Vorë–Hani i Hotit project is supported by the EBRD, EIB, and the EU through substantial financing.

Therefore, the problem cannot simply be explained by a lack of financing.

In its first monitoring of the 2025–2029 Government Program, PoliFakt assessed overall feasibility at 72/100. The Economy, Fiscal Policy and Infrastructure pillar received 71 points, but within it infrastructure scored only 64 points and was identified as the “most problematic area.” The report notes that progress is faster in areas such as European integration and tourism, while it is slower in infrastructure projects.

Furthermore, PoliFakt’s analysis places the problem not only in the availability of funds, but in institutional capacity to turn funds and projects into results. In the report’s conclusions, infrastructure, PPPs, digitalization, and anti-corruption emerge as areas where the risk is more institutional and ethical than merely technical.

This is a finding that should be taken very seriously.

In a given year, we may have a new port, but if it is built later than market demand requires, we will have lost part of the advantage. We may have a railway, but if it is connected to the port after flows have been directed elsewhere, the economic impact will be reduced. Likewise, we may have highways, but if they are not connected to logistics terminals and border crossings, they remain primarily national investments rather than international corridors.

Thus, the cost of delay is not only the cost of construction, and this is perhaps the most important point that should be introduced into the Albanian debate.

When a project is delayed, its cost is usually measured through increases in contract prices, interest, administrative costs, or the postponement of deadlines. But in the case of economic corridors, there is another cost: the cost of the lost opportunity.

If we could attract part of the regional flow of goods in 2027, but the infrastructure does not become fully operational until 2030, the loss will not simply be three years of construction. Calculations show that these are three years during which logistics companies, importers, exporters, and international operators may have consolidated another route.

In this sense, one year of delay does not always have the same economic value as the previous year.

The more competing corridors become consolidated, the more expensive delay becomes.

This is why developments in Serbia, North Macedonia, and the Asian corridors must be read together with Albania’s projects.

If the Porto Romano–Sukth–Durrës–Rrogozhinë–Corridor VIII system functions as a single network, then we can create one of the most important economic advantages that has been missing for decades: logistics infrastructure connecting Albanian production with regional and European markets at lower cost.

PoliFakt’s assessments of the road connection between the Elbasan Bypass and Corridor VIII suggest the potential for a reduction of around 10–15% in the logistics costs of goods in transit, if the connection operates in an integrated manner.

This should not be interpreted as an indication that all Albanian imports and exports will automatically become 10–15% cheaper. It is more accurate to treat it as the potential for cost reductions in flows that benefit from multimodal connectivity and from shorter logistics times and distances.

The second effect would be on private investment.

A company does not invest only where there is labor and a market. It seeks access to transport, energy, storage, and markets. A functional corridor creates opportunities for warehousing centers, light processing, regional distribution, and port-related industries.

This could gradually change the economic structure of the Durrës–Tirana–Elbasan area.

In this case, infrastructure would no longer be merely public expenditure. It would become a platform for private capital.

But there is another scenario…

If Porto Romano is delayed, the railway connection remains incomplete, and Corridor VIII advances faster in other parts of the region, our country risks remaining a fragmented corridor.

There will be a port.

There will be roads.

There will be railways.

But they will not necessarily create a system.

This is the worrying scenario that must be avoided.

Part of the problem identified by PoliFakt for 2025–2026 is precisely this fragmentation. The program has many objectives and investments, but their implementation is not progressing at the same pace. In the first monitoring, only around 20% of operational objectives were fully on track, while 70% were in progress with challenges and 10% were at high risk.

This does not mean that the program is failing. On the contrary, PoliFakt assesses the program as feasible in principle. But it shows that the gap between ambition and implementation capacity remains one of the main obstacles.

What needs to change in the Albanian approach?

At this stage, Albania no longer needs another list of infrastructure projects. It needs a different way of managing them.

Porto Romano, Durrës–Rrogozhinë, Sukth–Porto Romano, Vorë–Hani i Hotit, Corridor VIII, and the road connections should not be monitored as separate files belonging to different ministries. They should be treated as part of a single economic project: the creation of an Albanian multimodal hub connected to the markets of the Balkans and Europe.

This requires the deadlines for the port to be linked to the deadlines for the railway. The railway deadlines must be linked to the deadlines for Corridor VIII. The corridor must be linked to logistics terminals, and all of these must be linked to a strategy for attracting international operators.

If this is not done, we may end up building infrastructure before the market that will use it has been built.

If it is done, public investment can generate an effect far greater than its initial value.

Albania has a rare window of opportunity: a major port on the Adriatic, Corridor VIII, connections with Kosovo and North Macedonia, European financing, growing maritime trade, and a Europe that is seeking more diversified and resilient supply routes. At the same time, China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are developing new logistics connections, while Central Asia is investing in corridors toward Europe.

Therefore, Albania should read this landscape not as another infrastructure opportunity, but as a competition for economic positioning.

If the port, railway, and roads are completed on time and function together, Albania can move from an economy that mainly consumes and imports through foreign corridors to an economy that benefits from the transit, processing, and distribution of goods.

If delays continue, the loss will not immediately appear in budget statistics. It will appear later in contracts that were not signed, operators that chose other ports, logistics investments that were located elsewhere, and trade flows that passed alongside Albania without entering its economy.

This is the dimension that must be added to the Albanian debate on infrastructure.