Does the amendment to the law on tourist ports endanger competition and the public interest?

In this debate, we are not simply talking about a technical legal amendment.
What is at stake is the way Albania manages its strategic public assets, especially ports, which are natural monopolies and part of public property.
They directly affect maritime security, the environment, and public access, and any change in the rules governing them cannot be treated merely as a matter of private investment.

Tourism is one of the country’s main economic engines, contributing around 26.4% of GDP in the most recent year, according to calculations by ALTAX based on INSTAT and Bank of Albania statistics and the World Bank methodology.
The Albanian coastline is a high-potential asset for luxury development and elite tourism. To compete with destinations such as Croatia and Greece, the country needs modern port infrastructure, including yacht marinas and cruise ports.
Naturally, without these investments, the coastline’s potential risks remaining underutilized.

However, ports do not function like private businesses.
They constitute strategic infrastructure with broad public impact, and any exemption from competition rules directly affects the foundations of the market economy and equal access. This approach is not merely a political choice, as it determines whether public assets will be administered in the general interest or concentrated in a few private hands.

The amendment to the law “On Tourist Ports,” proposed by MP Sinaj, provides that in cases where an entity has obtained “strategic investment/investor, assisted/special procedure” status from the Strategic Investments Committee and the tourist port is an integral part of the approved investment, the construction and operation of the port shall be exempted from the ordinary regime provided for in Article 6 of the law.
The procedures and documentation for concluding the contract will be determined by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

This means that the amendment does not eliminate all legal regulation, but replaces a general competitive procedure with a special administrative regime linked to “strategic” status and executive decision-making.
This is precisely where the core of the debate lies.

The strategic investment instrument has existed since 2015 and aims, in theory, to attract large investments exceeding 50–100 million euros, create jobs, and bring technology transfer. Some projects in the energy and tourism sectors have functioned with limited success, showing that the mechanism can be effective in certain cases.

Supporters of the amendment argue that removing “bureaucratic overlaps” is necessary to quickly attract capital for luxury marinas in areas such as Sazan and Zvërnec.
Formally, this argument has a procedural basis, since if an investment has already been approved as strategic, requiring a second procedure may be considered duplication of processes.

However, the problem does not lie in acceleration, but in the nature of the process.
Strategic status is not equivalent to an open competitive procedure. It is granted on the basis of an application by a specific entity and an administrative decision, not through competition among several operators for the same public asset.
Thus, we are moving from open competition to administrative selection. This increases the scope of decision-making according to the government’s own assessment and reduces the level of guarantees clearly defined in the law.

Albanian experience shows that exemptions from competitive procedures have produced high costs for the budget and serious transparency problems, as in the cases of incinerators, road projects, or certain tourism assets granted without competition.
The argument of “removing bureaucracy” cannot replace economic analysis and real competition.

The claim that the amendment has “zero financial effect” is weak in the absence of a detailed analysis.
World Bank and IMF studies show that competitive procedures increase the value of contracts for the state by 10–30%.
When there is no competition, the state may lose fees, revenue-sharing arrangements, and investment conditions that would have been negotiated in a competitive environment. This does not automatically mean that the state loses, but it implies a real risk that requires in-depth financial assessment.

The absence of a national master plan for ports and of a strategic impact assessment constitutes a serious gap. Decisions on strategic assets cannot be taken without a national framework addressing competition, the environment, security, and public access.

The amendment also raises concerns regarding equality before the law and European public procurement standards.
Removing competition for a privileged category of investors must be justified with strong analysis and clear control mechanisms; otherwise, it risks being perceived as unjustified differentiation. In a context where the Corruption Perceptions Index is 39/100 (Transparency International, 2025), the risk of clientelist favoritism is not hypothetical.

Long-term macroeconomic effects must also be considered as an important part of the current debate.
The concentration of ports in a few private hands may affect prices, access, and the structure of competition in the tourism market. Such a precedent could gradually weaken the market economy and create tension with European integration standards.

Strategic investments are necessary and welcome.
But coastal development must be accompanied by real guarantees for transparency, competition, and protection of the public interest. Every port project should be supported by full economic analysis, public consultation, clear criteria for strategic status, parliamentary oversight, a long-term reversion clause, and a guaranteed share of revenues for the state. Every exemption must be fully aligned with the EU acquis.

Coastal development should serve the national economy, citizens, and future generations and must not create structures of privilege.
When competition is replaced by administrative selection without strong safeguards, the law risks losing its function as an instrument of the rule of law and turning into a tool for distributing favors.
In the end, the cost is borne by the public.